Semantic integrity · Deterministic rules for agents
Prove what your agents can't do.
Then let them do more.
Your rules, written in plain language, become verified code that checks every agent action before it runs. Same action, same verdict, every time.
rule
“No confidential data is allowed to reach the public web.”
- allow
read · earnings_q3.xlsx
now carrying confidential data
- deny
web fetch · external.web
would send confidential data to the public web
signed · replayable
The Problem
The riskiest agent
is the one that’s just helping.
| Start | Step 3 | Step 172 | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| Engineering “Fix the slow queries and clean up” | tunes index allowed | deletes files to free space allowed | the files were the customer database |
| Finance “Benchmark our margins” | reads the margin model allowed | types figures into external tool allowed | financials leave the building |
| HR “Close the CFO search” | reads the offer file allowed | queries outside comp tool allowed | MNPI disclosed |
Every action was allowed. The damage is in the sequence.
The Solution
Make the agent
follow your rules.
| Start | Step 3 | Step 172 | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| Engineering “Fix the slow queries and clean up” | tunes index allow | deletes files to free space deny would delete customer_db · blocked before execution | customer database intact |
| Finance “Benchmark our margins” | reads the margin model allow | types figures into external tool steer redirected to the approved benchmark tool | benchmark delivered |
| HR “Close the CFO search” | reads the offer file allow | queries outside comp tool escalate held for human sign-off | nothing disclosed |
The rules you already have
Prompts, policy docs, SOPs. Sondera compiles them into verified code.
Block deletion of any file classified as customer data.
Reasoned · 8 tools done
-
Blocking Customer Data Deletion I'm focusing on implementing a robust mechanism to block deletion of anything classified as customer data…
- Reading the policy pack done
- Listing pack sections done
-
Implementing File Deletion Block I'm currently working on a label-gated file block that keys off the resource's classification…
- Listing pack sections done
- Fetching pack sections done
-
Drafting Policy Logic I'm now focusing on defining “customer data” for the policy so the rule is precise…
- Listing semantic categories done
-
Identifying Customer Data I'm focusing on how to accurately flag “customer data” so the rule catches every variant…
- Validating the draft done
-
Validating Candidate Policy My current focus is on behaviorally validating the draft against recorded trajectories…
- Validating the draft done
-
Considering Gate Configurations I've been thinking about how to best represent the pre-tool gate for this rule…
- Behaviorally validating the draft done
Summary
Agents operating under § Block Customer Data File Delete attempting to delete any resource labeled CustomerData are denied before execution.
Rationale human-authored
Block deletion of any file classified as customer data.
Cedar source
@id("forbid-file-delete-customer-data")
@description("Deny FileDelete on any resource labeled CustomerData")
forbid (
principal,
action == Sondera::Action::"FileDelete",
resource
) when {
resource.label == Sondera::Label::"CustomerData"
}; ✓ cedar check · valid · 0 errors · 0 warnings
Based on our research
“Autoformalization of Agent Instructions into Policy-as-Code” · arXiv 2606.26649 · ICML 2026 AIWILD · FLoC 2026 LLM-Solve
Why Sondera
Semantic integrity
Neural reads.
Symbolic decides.
Every action scanned at runtime: secrets, instruction sources, content signatures.
Each finding is written into session state as a fact.
Models, exactly where they’re strong.
Every action checked deterministically before it runs.
allow deny steer escalate
Rules, exactly where it counts: the verdict.
Semantic integrity: your intent, enforced at the action layer.
- 01 Source Authority Who gave this instruction, and were they allowed to?
- 02 Task Alignment Is this action still serving the task the user gave?
- 03 Data Isolation Is data crossing a boundary it shouldn't?
- 04 Action Alignment Is the action about to run the action that was approved?
A model’s verdict is a guess. Ours is a function.
Research presented at
How it works
Natural language in.
Verified enforcement out.
-
01 · in the agent
Hooks
Every action intercepted before it runs.
Every file edit, shell command, web fetch, code execution.
Checked before · recorded after.
-
02 · the decision
Policy engine
Every action adjudicated in context of the whole trajectory.
allow deny steer escalate
Same input · same verdict.
-
03 · the record
Console
What ran, what was stopped, and why.
Per agent, per user, per policy.
Every verdict signed · replayable.
Security leaders
Prove what agents can’t do.
Then let them build more of themselves.
Get in touch
Book a demo
See your own rules compiled into policy and enforced against a live agent trajectory. We’ll reach out to schedule a time.